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SHAPE UP OR SHIP OUT:
ACCOUNTABILITY TO THIRD
PARTIES FOR PATENT
AMBIGUITIES IN
TESTAMENTARY DOCUMENTS
ANGELA M. VALLARIO *

I. INTRODUCTION

The attorney's preparation of a testamentary document 1
(hereinafter sometimes referred to as a will2 or revocable trust 3) should

* Angela M. Vallario is an Assistant Professor at the University of Baltimore
School of Law. B.S., University of Florida; J.D., University of Baltimore School of
Law; LL.M. (Taxation), Georgetown University Law Center.
I. In this article, references to the term 'testamentary' document are intended to
include a valid will and/or valid revocable trust. A will becomes effective upon the
testator's death. A revocable trust becomes irrevocable upon the settlor's death. This
article's focus is limited to the disposition of the preparer's property at his or her death
through these testamentary documents. See Black's Law Dictionary 1513 (Bryan A.
Gamer ed., 8th ed., West 2004). Other testamentary documents, such as life estate
deeds, are beyond the scope of this article.
2. A valid will is prepared in accordance with the statutory formalities. Every
jurisdiction requires statutory formalities in order for the document to constitute an
effective testamentary transfer. E.g. Cal. Prob. Code § 6100 (West 1991 & Supp.
2004); Md. Estate & Trust Code Ann. §§ 4-101-4-102 (LEXIS 2001 & Supp. 2004);
N. Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 3-2.1 (McKinney 2004). Additionally, an individual
preparing the testamentary document (hereinafter sometimes referred to as "testator")
must possess legal and testamentary capacity as well as testamentary intent. See also
Joel C. Dobris, Stewart E. Sterk & Melanie B. Leslie, Estates & Trusts, 478 (2d ed.,
West 2003).
3. Except for a few jurisdictions, the preparation of a revocable trust generally is
not monitored by statutory formalities. See e.g. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 689.075 (West 1994
& Supp. 2004). Throughout this article all references to trusts are limited to a trust in
59
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clearly and accurately reflect the client's last wishes. 4 Although these
testamentary documents should reflect the client's intent, 5 they often
fall short of accomplishing that goa1. 6 There are numerous examples of
will and trust construction cases that exhaust tremendous resources in
an effort to ascertain the client's wishes or intent. 7 Many of these cases
involve the construction of patent8 and/or latent9 ambiguities which
which the settlor retains the right to revoke and has a retained interest for his or her life.
Thus, the completed transfer of the beneficial interest takes place upon the settlor's
death. Dobris, supra n. 2, at 512.
4. See e.g. Auric v. Conti. Cas. Co., 331 N.W. 325, 329 (Wis. 1983) (stating it was
a "constitutional right to make a will and have it carried out according to the testator's
intention").
5. See Dobris, supra n. 2, at 302; see also Blodget v. Delaney, 201 F.2d 589, 593
(1st Cir. 1953) (finding that "the extent ofa beneficiary's interest is determined by the
intention of the testator ascertained by reading his language with reference to the
circumstances surrounding its use"); Dauphin Deposit Trust Co. v. McGinnis, 324 F.2d
458, 462 (3d Cir. 1963) (stating that "[the] intention of the testator must be ascertained
from a consideration of the entire will, including the language used, the scheme of
distribution, and the attendant circumstances"); Scott T. Jarboe, Student Author,
Interpreting a Testator's Intent From the Language of Her Will: A Descriptive
Linguistics Approach, 80 Wash. U. L. Q. 1365, 1366 n. 6 (2002) (stating that "the
determination of the testator's intent is the 'pole star' of judicial interpretation").
6. Dobris, supra n. 2, at 302 (pointing out that sometimes what the client expects
and what occurs are markedly different). This difference may result from the natural
course of events or from attorney malpractice. This article addresses the latter instance
and what may be done to protect client expectations and the interests of third parties.
7. See infra pt. IV.B. (providing examples of will construction cases); see also
Hebden v. Keirn, 75 A.2d 126, 128 (Md. 1950) (finding that it was not the testatrix's
intention to give the sum of $8,000 to her brother's estate if he predeceased her, and
therefore, demonstrating that costs of litigation could easily exceed the $8,000 harm to
the beneficiary).
8. See e.g. Hawman v. Thomas, 44 Md. 30,49 (App. 1876) (stating that "patent
ambiguities appear[ing] on the face of the writing itself, as a general rule, cannot be
explained or removed by extrinsic evidence. In such a case, the court's [function is to]
ascertain the meaning of the words actually employed, not the secret intention of the
party); Maguire v. Maguire, 34 So. 443, 446 (La. 1903) (holding that when interpreting
wills, the intent of the testator guides the court, the construction of a will must not put
into the mouth of the testator that which he refrained from saying); In re Wainwright's
Estate, 101 A.2d 724, 725 (Pa. 1954) (stating that "where a testator fails to [provide]
for a contingency which actually happens, courts do not have authority to insert a
provision into the will and supply the omission under the assumption that it was the
intention of the testator").
9. A latent ambiguity is discovered when the personal representative attempts to
carry out the provisions of the will or trust. See Scheurer v. Tomberlin, 240 So. 2d 172,
176 (Fla. App. 1st Dist. 1970) (finding the absence of actual grandchildren in the face
of a bequest for the benefit of "presently living grandchildren" was a latent ambiguity

2004

PATENT DEFECTS IN TESTAMENTARY DOCUMENTS

61

should have been resolved by appropriate drafting. lO This article's
scope is limited to patent ambiguities caused by the attorney's
negligence and their detrimental impact on third parties. In these
situations, the patent ambiguity is easily identified and the claim of
negligence is clear. I I A patent ambiguity is obvious from the face of
the will and is easily discovered prior to the testator's death. For
example, a patent ambiguity exists where two different provisions of a
will dispose of the same plot of land to different devisees. 12 The
attorney's close reading of the will should have discovered this error.
The attorney's failure to correct the patent ambiguity prior to the
testator's death has detrimental consequences for the third party
harmed. Extrinsic evidence is generally not admissible to resolve a
patent ambiguity, because courts are unwilling to add to or detract from
the written words of the will. 13
The Rules of Professional Conduct require competent
representation l4 of the estate-planning attorneyl5 (hereinafter "Ethical
Rule"). The existence of a patent ambiguity in a testamentary
document suggests that the estate-planning attorney has in some way
failed to render competent legal services. Although a violation of this
in the will. Extrinsic evidence, including the relation of the parties was admissible to
show the persons to whom decedent intended).
10. Jesse Dukeminier & Stanley Johanson, Wills, Trusts and Estates, 409 (6th ed.,
Aspen L. & Bus. 2000).
II. This author believes that attorneys should also be accountable to third parties in
the case of some latent ambiguities, but that issue will be addressed in a subsequent
article.
12. See William J. Bowe & Douglas H. Parker, Page on the Law of Wills vol. 4, §
32.7,255 (rev. ed., W.H. Anderson Co. 1961); Succession of Neff, 716 So.2d 410,412
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1998).
13. See e.g. Hershon v. Gibraltar Bldg. & Loan Assn., 864 F.2d 848, 851 (D.C.
1989); Bondv. Wiegardt, 216 P.2d 196,199 (Wash. 1950).
14. Model R. Prof. Conduct 1.1 (ABA 2004). This rule requires that a "lawyer shall
provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the
legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation." Id.
15. The term 'estate-planning attorney' is used throughout this article to mean the
attorney responsible for preparing the will or revocable trust. The reference in no way
suggests a specialization or expertise in the estates and trust field and excludes nonlawyers. If a non-lawyer prepares the testamentary document, it is unclear as to what
duties and responsibilities attach. See Angela M. Vallario, Living Trusts and the
Unauthorized Practice of Law: A Good Thing Gone Bad, 59 Md. L. Rev. 595, 620-22
(2000) (discussing the standard of care and problems associated with non-lawyers
engaging in this service).
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Ethical Rule does not give rise to a malpractice action,16 a patent
ambiguity reflects so poorly on the attorney's standard of care 17 that a
8
permitted inference of negligence I should be drawn.
When the testamentary document includes a patent ambiguity, a
malpractice action brought by the estate 19 is of little consequence
20
because the estate is rarely lessened in value by the negligence.
Instead, third parties who lose their inheritances due to a patent defect
should have legal recourse to be made whole.
In this instance,
compensatory damages should be used as the appropriate remedy in
which what would have been received but for the error is compared to
21
what was received.
Yet, current law does not provide a remedy
16. See Stephen Gillers & Roy D. Simon, Regulation of Lawyers 19 (Aspen L. &
Bus. 2001); Ann Peters, The Mode Rules as a Guide for Legal Malpractice, 6 Geo. J.
Legal Ethics 609 (1993) (explaining the trend by courts to use the ethics codes as a
rebuttable presumption of malpractice).
17. The standard of care in drafting wills varies among jurisdictions. A majority of
jurisdictions apply one of three standards: An objective standard, community standard
or subjective standard. See e.g. Wright v. Williams, 121 Cal. Rptr. 194, 199 (2d Dist.
1975) (discussing that the objective standard requires the attorney to use reasonable
prudence and skill); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Keown, 451 F. Supp. 397,401 (D.NJ.
1978) (stating that the community standard compares an attorney's conduct to that of
other attorneys practicing in the same or a similar community); Palmer v. Nissen, 256
F. Supp. 497,501 (D. Me. 1966). The subjective standard is based on the premise that
if an attorney acts on his or her honest, well-founded belief, he or she will not be liable.
18. See pt. I1I.B.l (discussing the permitted inference of negligence due to the
existence ofa patent ambiguity).
19. See Bradley E. S. Fogel, Attorney v. Client-Privity, Malpractice, and the Lack
of Respect for the Primacy of the Attorney-Client Relationship in Estate Planning, 68
Tenn. L. Rev. 261, 267 (Winter 2001) (discussing the compelling case for estateplanning malpractice. "In order to recover for legal malpractice, a plaintiff must
prove[:] (I) [T]he attorney owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, (2) the attorney violated
that duty, (3) the attorney's negligence was the proximate cause of injury to the
plaintiff, and (4) damages.").
20. The exception being the costs of will construction litigation. See Eugene F.
Scoles, Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Ronald C. Link & Patricia Roberts, Problems and
Materials on Decedents' Estates and Trusts 213 (6th ed., Aspen L. & Bus. 2000). See
also Ventura County Humane Society v. Holloway, 115 Cal. Rptr. 464, 468 (App. 1st
Dist. 1984) (where beneficiaries unsuccessfully argued for the recovery of their costs
of litigating a will construction case).
21. See Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies 3 (2d ed., West 1993); see also Hanna v.
Martin, 49 So. 2d 585, 587 (Fla. 1951) (explaining that "[a] fundamental principle of
the law of damages is that a person injured by breach of contract or by wrongful or
negligent act or omission shall have fair and just compensation commensurate with loss
sustained in consequence of defendant's act which gives rise to action"); Phillips v.
Chesson, 8 S.E.2d 343, 347 (N.C. 1950) (determining that the "objective of any
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because an attorney's duty to his or her client to draft a testamentary
document free from patent ambiguities does not automatically extend
to third parties at the client's death. 22 In order to provide an adequate
remedy to third parties when a testamentary provision fails because of
a patent ambiguity, changes in the law are warranted. The attorney's
duty to draft testamentary documents free from patent ambiguities must
automatically extend to third parties and extrinsic evidence must be
admissible for the third party to prove harm. These changes will
provide third parties with both recourse to pursue their claim and a
remedy.
This article first describes patent ambiguities and the rule of
construction relating to the admissibility of extrinsic evidence in
ascertaining a testator's intent. 23 Secondly, the article addresses the
attorney's duty of care owed to clients in the preparation of
testamentary documents. Thirdly, the article analyzes and critiques the
existing methods used by third parties bringing a cause of action
against the negligent drafter. Finally, this article addresses alternatives
and concludes that the only way to adequately police and deter patent
errors from occurring is to allow the malpractice action to proceed and
allow for the admission of extrinsic evidence so the third parties are
able to establish harm.
II. PATENT AMBIGUITIES AND THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EXTRINSIC
EVIDENCE

A. PATENT AND LATENT AMBIGUITY DISTINCTIONS
The existence of a patent ambiguity in a testamentary document
prompts will or trust construction litigation because the testamentary
document is in some way facially unclear. The classification of the
uncertainty as a patent ambiguity arises when the uncertainty is

proceeding to rectify a wrongful injury resulting in loss is to restore the victim to his
original condition, to give back to him that which was lost as far as it may be done by
compensation in money").
22. See infra pt. IV.B. (discussing approaches for accountability to third parties).
23. The term 'testator' is used generically throughout this article to describe a male
or female person who prepares a will, and also the client signing the testamentary
document. In the case of a revocable trust the person creating the trust is referred to as
"settlor."
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"apparent on the face" of the document itself. 24 This article's
discussion of a patent ambiguity is limited to when the ambiguity
amounts to a contradiction,25 or requires the court to fill in the blank
as to a beneficiary26 or property.27 For example, in Knupp v. District
ojColumbia,28 the decedent's will stated that his residual estate was to
pass to a person specified in another paragraph in the will, where no
designee was named. This uncertainty was labeled a patent one. The
court excluded extrinsic evidence in support of the intended
beneficiary, despite the reliability of such evidence, including an
acknowledgment by the drafting attorney that Mr. Knupp was the
intended beneficiary. In the case of a patent ambiguity, without the aid
of extrinsic evidence, the ambiguous provision fails. In KnufP, the
decedent's property escheated to the District of Columbia. 2 The
patent defect and the scrivener's carelessness are apparent to a
layperson from the face of the document without the requirement of an
expert. 3D
When an attorney drafts a testamentary document that includes a
patent ambiguity, he or she should be liable to those injured. Liability
24. E.g. Gafford v. Kirby, 512 So.2d 1356, 1362 (Ala. 1987) (characterizing a
patent ambiguity as one that reflects an inadequacy inherent on the face of the
document existing since the execution of the instrument); In re Estate of Corrigan, 358
N.W.2d 501, 503 (Neb. 1984) (finding the ambiguity a patent one, that is, one
appearing on the face of the document, from the language used); see also In re
Butterfield's Estate, 275 N.W.2d 262, 267 (Mich. 1979); Boatmen's Union Nat. Bank
v. Welton, 640 S.W.2d 497,502 (Mo. App. 1982).
25. See Succession of Neff, 716 So. 2d 410, 411-412 (La. App. 1998) (labeling
ambiguity patent but allowing extrinsic evidence where a will containing two residuary
clauses with different dispositive schemes-one provision devised the testatrix's
disposable estate to one daughter and the other disposed the same property in equal
shares to both daughters); Morse v. Zatkiewiez, 168 S.E. 219, 222-224 (N.c. 1969)
(considering extrinsic evidence to determine whether testatrix intended to pay alimony
to her son's ex-wife where the testatrix's will provided for the payment of her son's
creditors but named someone other than her son as the sole beneficiary of her estate).
26. Knupp v. D.C., 578 A.2d 702, 704 (D.C. 1990).
27. Wilson v. First Florida Bank, 498 So.2d 1289, 1291 (Fla. 2d Dist. App. 1986)
(finding the defect a patent ambiguity where a will contained detailed provisions with
respect to how a university should award scholarships, but contained no words of
conveyance).
28. Knupp v. D.C., 578 A.2d at 703.
29. !d. at 703. Property escheats when the decedent dies without heirs. Dobris,
supra n. 2, at 72. When property escheats it passes to the state or to a designated
agency of the state. Black's Law Dictionary at 584.
30. The defect is so obvious there is no need to ascertain the opinion of an expert.
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in this situation should occur because, like the Res Ipsa Loquitur
doctrine,31 such an obvious defect "speaks for itself' and reflects a lack
of due care. To impose a duty on the attorney to draft testamentary
documents free from patent ambiguities is not unduly burdensome,32
nor does it amount to a duty to draft litigation-free documents. 33
Therefore, when a patent ambiguity exists in the decedent's
testamentary document, the malpractice action against the attorney
should be straightforward because patent defects do not exist in this
instance but for some degree of negligence.
More often, will and trust construction cases arise because of the
existence of a latent ambiguity.34 A latent ambiguity arises when the
testamentary provisions of the document are applied to the testator's
property or beneficiaries. 35 For example, in one case the word "home"
31. The Res Ipsa Loquitur doctrine permits the jury to infer a defendant's negligent
conduct "typically, because the 'jury can reasonably draw upon past experience
common to the community for the conclusion that the adverse event generally would
not occur absent negligent conduct.'" Scott L. Haworth & Melissa Cronin Welch,
2002-2003 Survey ofNew York Law, 54 Syracuse L. Rev. 1419,1426 (2004).
32. See infra pt. IILA.2. (discussing the duty of care owed at the preparation and
review stage of the estate-planning process).
33. Ventura County Humane Society v. Holloway, liS Cal. Rptr. 464, 469 (App. 1st
Dist. 1984). In Ventura, the attorney prepared a will bequeathing substantial sums to
various charities, including one designated as "Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals (Local or National)," a non-existent organization. The San Francisco Society
for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (SFSPCA) asserted that it alone was entitled
to the funds bequeathed under the particular clause of the will. A class action suit
against the drafting attorney alleged that the ambiguity in the will constituted a breach
of contract, negligence, and professional malpractice. The court rejected this contention
stating that no good reason existed why the attorney should be held accountable for
using certain words suggested or selected by the testator which later proved to be
ambiguous. If such a rule were adopted, the duty thus created, would amount to a
requirement to draft litigation-proof legal documents. This unlimited liability, as the
trial judge observed, would result in a speculative and almost intolerable burden on the
legal profession. Id.
34. See Survey of Cases <http://home.ubalt.eduintlavalV
surveyofrnalpracticecases.htm> (accessed Oct. I, 2004) (providing a survey of
malpractice actions by jurisdiction); see e.g. In re Carney's Will, 47 N.Y.S.2d 399, 399
(N.Y. Surrog. 1943) (finding latent ambiguity where a name used in will to designate a
residuary legatee was equally applicable to two persons with identical names and in
equal degree of kinship to testatrix); Hawkins v. Garland's Adminstr., 76 Va. 149, 157
(1882) (admitting extrinsic evidence to show testator's intent to give $1,000 to each of
four of his namesakes, the last of whom he described as "Samuel G., son of Captain
John F. Slaughter," when there was no such person).
35. Harris v. Hines, 137 S.W. 3d 898, 908 (Tex. App. 6th Dist. 2004) (stating a
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was ambiguous, and will construction litigation was required to
determine whether the decedent intended the word to mean the
principal residence or the residence and abutting acreage. 36 Latent
ambiguities can arise for reasons other than the attorney's negligence,
such as a miscommunication by the client. For example, a will that
bequeaths "my 1999 BMW to Joe" results in a latent ambiguity if at the
testator's death, he had a son and grandson both named Joe. This latent
defect, which becomes apparent only when the personal representative
attempts to carry out the provisions of the will, could have resulted
from a number of reasons. 37 In order to ascertain the testator's
intended specific legatee, extrinsic evidence, such as the testator's lack
of knowledge of his grandson, is admissible to shed light on the
testator's intent. 38
B. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION
The classification of the ambiguity as patent or latent is important
in will and trust construction cases because there are different rules
regarding the admission of extrinsic evidence used to resolve the
uncertainty. The resolution of the ambiguity with the admission of
extrinsic evidence often allows the third party to take,39 making the
malpractice action moot. 40
"latent ambiguity" exists when the will appears to convey a sensible meaning on its
face, but it cannot be carried out without further clarification). See also In re Lepley's
Estate, 17 N.W.2d 526, 529 (Iowa 1945); Carney v. Johnson, 422 P.2d 486, 488
(Wash.I967);InreGibbs'Estate, III N.W.2d413,4I7(Wis.I96I).
36. See In re Sandersfeld's Estate, 9 Cal. Rptr. 447, 452 (App. 4th Dist. 1960)
(stating that when ascertaining intent, other doctrines such as plain meaning, personal
usage exception, and others are employed); see also Joseph W. deFuria, Jr., Mistakes in
Wills Resultingfrom Scriveners' Errors: The Argument for Reformation, 40 Cath. U. L.
Rev. 1, 13 (1990).
37. Latent ambiguities could also arise from the attorney's negligence. For example,
the failure of the attorney to ascertain the testator's blood relatives and his or her
failure to better identify the specific legatee could have caused the latent ambiguity.
See infra Part II1.A.1. (discussing the attorney's obligations in obtaining accurate and
complete information).
38. But see Gifford v. Dyer, 2 R.I. 99, 102 (1852) (holding that the mistake doctrine
would not be applicable where a testatrix drafted her will with the impression that her
son had predeceased her because in using mistake "it must also appear what would
have been the will of the testatrix but for the mistake").
39. Wilson v. First Florida Bank, 498 So.2d 1289, 1292 (Fla. App. 2d Dist. 1986)
(allowing the residual estate to pass to a university because of the will's failure to
otherwise dispose of it). See also In re Campbell, 42 Haw. 586, 592 (1958) (holding
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1. Admissibility of Extrinsic Evidence for Patent Ambiguities
Historically, the rule of construction required a patent ambiguity
to be resolved from the document itself, not from extrinsic evidence
("no-extrinsic evidence rule,,).41 It is believed that an ambiguity which
appears in the writing can only be cured by the writing itself; i.e., by
merely construing the writing.''U The argument is that if the words in
the will had to be written and the testator constructed the will with
thought and express language, and did not go outside to express his
intent, then those who read the written words are not allowed to go
43
outside the will to aid in its interpretation.
The testator's absence and the uncertainty surrounding the
extrinsic evidence have precluded its use to resolve patent
44
45
ambiguities.
Extrinsic evidence would make the will hollow.
In
that "if two constructions of a will are each fairly possible, one of which indicates
absurd or unjust intention, and the other indicates reasonable and fair intention, [the]
courts [prefer] that the construction which indicates a reasonable and fair intention");
Poe v. Sheehan, 151 N.E.2d 660,665 (Ohio App. 8th Dist. 1958) (finding that, where
decedent has expressed his wishes for succession of his property in a properly executed
will, every reasonable effort must be made to avoid intestacy).
40. A third party provided a remedy by the court from the estate does not have a
second cause of action against the attorney. However, when the third party is not made
whole because the extrinsic evidence is insufficient or inadmissible, a malpractice
action will more likely proceed. See Knupp v. Schoeber, 1992 WL 182323 at *5 (D.C.
July 14, 1992).
41. See Hawman v. Thomas, 44 Md. 30,46 (1876) (holding that using extrinsic
evidence for the purpose of showing what property was intended to be conveyed was
inadmissible because it failed to state any property on which a bequest could operate
and there was not an expression elsewhere in the will by which the omission could be
supplied); accord Helmer v. Voss, 646 S.W.2d 738, 741 (Mo. 1983) (admitting
extrinsic evidence to resolve patent ambiguity about the identity of beneficiaries, their
relationship to the testators, and the nature and extent of testators' holdings; but then
looking to the language of the will after such explanatory material had been
considered); but see Matter of Estate of Arend, 373 N.W.2d 338, 342 (Minn. App.
1985) (admitting extrinsic evidence to resolve both patent and latent ambiguities in
will); In re Hurley, 248 N.W. 194, 195 (S.D. 1933) (allowing the use of extrinsic
evidence in a case involving a patent ambiguity).
42. James Bradley Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law
416 (Augustus M. Kelley 1969) (originally published 1898).
43. Id. at 417 (explaining the historical development of the introduction of extrinsic
evidence).
44. Jarboe, supra n. 5, at 1373 n. 51 (citing Andrea Cornelison, Dead Man Talking:
Are Courts Ready to Listen? The Erosion of the Plain Meaning Rule, 35 Real Prop.,
Prob. & Trust J. 811,815 (2001) (discussing courts' tendency to "doubt the reliability
of extrinsic evidence"».
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the case of a patent ambiguity, the concern over the reliability of such
evidence also stifled its introduction. For example, a will that disposes
of property to an unknown beneficiary wouldgermit countless claims,
causing great inconveniences and uncertainty. 0 In excluding extrinsic
evidence, one court stated no language in the will could lead a court to
infer the testator's intent. 47
The reluctance of the courts to admit extrinsic evidence to reform
a will in accordance with the testator's objective intent is warranted. 48
There will always be some risk and uncertainty associated with the use
of extrinsic evidence. The nature of a will and its effectiveness upon
the creator's death prohibit courts from ascertaining the testator's
actual intent. When a testator goes through the effort of preparing a
will, he or she has the right to expect that the language used in the
testamentary document will be honored. 49 Without these expectations,
the preparation of the will is meaningless. For these reasons this article
is not proposing that the fundamental purposes of will and trust
formalities be ignored even in cases of an attorney's obvious
negligence. However, when an attorney takes on the responsibility of
preparing a testamentary document, he or she should not only
understand and appreciate its significance but also take additional
precautions to ensure it is prepared correctly and accurately.
The application of the no-extrinsic-evidence rule to a
testamentary document involving a patent ambiguity is illo§ical,
because a contradiction, 50 or the failure to identify a beneficiary 1 or
property52 can never be resolved from the document itself. The
application of the no-extrinsic-evidence rule causes the patent

45. See Dobris, supra n. 2, at 210 (discussing the Statute of Frauds and Wills Act
requirement for a writing protects the testator from fraud, undue influence, and
mistake). If by using extrinsic evidence someone is permitted to add or change the
written words of the testator, the will would be of no practical use. Dukeminier &
Johanson, supra n. 10, at 426.
46. Thayer, supra n. 42, at 416.
47. Id. at 417 (excluding extrinsic evidence resulted in the beneficiary, the testator's
son, not taking).
48. James L. Robertson, Myth and Reality or, Is It "Perception and Taste?" in the
Reading of Donative Documents, 61 Fordham L. Rev. 1045, 1051-1052 (1993).
49. Jarboe, supra n. 5, at 1374 n. 59.
50. Succession afNeff, 716 So. 2d 410, 411 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1998).
51. Knupp v. D.C, 578 A.2d 702,705 (D.C. 1990).
52. Wilson v. First Fla. Bank, 498 So. 2d 1289,1290 (Fla. 2d Dist. App. 1986).
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provision to fail and eliminates any chance of recovery from the estate
for the third party harmed. Instead, the testator's heirs or unintended
beneficiaries are more likely to benefit from the patent ambiguity when
the court refuses to admit extrinsic evidence. The application of the
no-extrinsic-evidence rule to patent ambiguities places third parties
who fall victim to a patent defect in a much worse position than third
parties affected by a latent defect. 53 In the case of a patent defect, third
parties will be forced to bring a malpractice action against the
attorney. 54 Third parties also face the roadblock of satisfying the
jurisdiction's rule concerning the attorney's liability to third party
beneficiaries. 55 If they are unable to brin~ the malpractice action
because the jurisdiction follows strict privity, 6 or if they are unable to
satisfy the Jurisdiction's exceptions to strict privity57 or other
approaches, 5 it is shocking that the third party harmed by such an
obvious defect may be without a remedy and that the attorney
responsible may be immune from liability.
2. Admissibility ofExtrinsic Evidence for Latent Ambiguities

The rule of construction as to extrinsic evidence developed
differently for latent ambiguities. The courts began in the sixteenth
century, grudgingly and cautiously, to allow extrinsic evidence to
explain latent uncertainties. 59 Courts were willing to admit extrinsic
evidence to shed light on the testator's intent and clarify that which was
written,60 but not to add t0 61 or detract from the written words of the
53. See supra pt. II.B.2. (discussing the rule of construction and outcomes for latent
ambiguities).
54. Knupp v. Schoeber, 1992 WL 182323 at **2-4 (D.C. July 14, 1992); Knupp v.
D.C., 578 A.2d at 705.
55. See infra pt. IV. B (discussing the attorney's accountability to third parties when
the testamentary document he or she has prepared includes a patent ambiguity).
56. Infra pt. IV.B.l.
57. Infra pt. IV.B.2.
58. Infra pt. IV.B.3.
59. Thayer, supra n. 42, at 416.
60. See Dukeminier & Johanson, supra n. 10, at 427; see also Succession of Bacot,
502 So. 2d 1118, 1123 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1987) (admitting extrinsic evidence to
determine the testator's relationship with the intended legatee where the testator left a
holographic will which left all to "Danny" with whom testator lived and maintained an
ongoing homosexual relationship, and not to other "Dannies" with whom testator
allegedly had homosexual relationships lasting only several months).
61. See Assoc. of Survivors of the Seventh Ga. Regiment v. Larner, 3 F .2d 201, 203
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Will. 62 For example, in the "my 1999 BMW to Joe" hypothetical, the
latent ambiguity lies in which "Joe" was intended by the testator.
The classification of an ambiguity as patent or latent varies from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction,63 which has led to drastic differences as to
64
the admissibility of extrinsic evidence and outcomes.
Additionally,
in an effort to arrive at a more equitable result, some jurisdictions have
eliminated the distinction, noting that the patent/latent distinctions
served "no useful purpose.,,65 In jurisdictions where the distinction

(D.C. 1925) (finding certain conditions must be present to warrant the introduction of
extrinsic evidence; and in all cases in which such evidence has been received, it was
utilized only for the purpose of interpreting something actually written in the will and
never to add provisions to the will); Succession of Merritt, 581 So. 2d 728, 729 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1991) (using extrinsic evidence to determine what the words of the
testator, as written actually meant; not to rewrite a will or do violence to its terms); see
also In re Estate of Brownlee, 654 N.W.2d 206, 211 (S.D. 2002) (finding that when
interpreting a will, extrinsic evidence is admissible to identify the persons and property
referred to in the will and to enable the court to apply the words of the will to the
matter to which it relates).
62. Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills & Other Donative Transfers § 3.1
(1999).
63. See In re Sandersfeld's Estate, 9 Cal. Rptr. 447, 451 (App. 4th Dist. 1960)
(labeling the meaning of the word "home" as a latent ambiguity and allowed extrinsic
evidence); Carlisle v. Est. of Carlisle, 252 So. 2d 894,895-96 (Miss. 1971) (finding
that the word meaning of the "home" a patent ambiguity and thus allowing extrinsic
evidence).
64. See Survey of Cases, supra n. 34 (presenting a survey of malpractice case where
the courts' different labeling has lead to a different rule with respect to the admission
of extrinsic evidence).
65. See e.g. In re Estate of Cole, 621 N.W.2d 816, 819 (Minn. 2001). The will
bequeathed to appellant Vining "the sum of two hundred thousand dollars ($25,000)."
Id. at 817. The attorney submitted an affidavit that it was the testator's intent to leave
$25,000 not $200,000. The Supreme Court of Minnesota allowed extrinsic evidence to
ascertain the testator's intent, and stated,
[W]e are satisfied that the trial court correctly denigrated the usefulness of a
distinction between patent and latent ambiguities for determining what type
of extrinsic evidence should be considered when construing ambiguous or
contradictory provisions. Because it is reasonable for the Minnesota
judiciary to weigh evidence of the testator's declarations of intent, the basis
of the patent/latent distinction appears outmoded.... We appreciate in
general, the frustration scriveners encounter in trying to express perfectly
their client's wishes, which frequently creates ambiguities, such that justice
requires consideration of extrinsic evidence to determine intent . . . we no
longer view testimony about the testator's declarations of intent as inherently
unreliable.
Id.at819.
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continues, the exclusion of extrinsic evidence to resolve patent
66
ambiguities understandably stems from the possibility of fabrication.
This article recognizes that there are distinctions between patent
and latent uncertainties. The disparate treatment by the courts over the
67
introduction of extrinsic evidence is analyzed.
The existence of a
patent ambiguity in a testamentary document violates strong public
policy and the law must provide an adequate remedy to a third party
harmed by the patent ambiguity. In order to provide this remedy, the
attorney's duty to draft testamentary documents free from patent
ambiguities must be automatically extended to third parties and
68
extrinsic evidence must be admissible to show harm.
III. DUTY OF CARE OWED TO CLIENT IN THE PREPARATION OF WILLS
AND REVOCABLE TRUSTS
When an attorney renders services to prepare a will or trust, an
attorney-client relationship69 exists between the testator and drafting
attorney, and it is the testator to whom the attorney owes "professional
71
responsibility.,,70 The attorney is expected to draft a valid document
that disposes of the client's property in accordance with the client's

66. Jarboe, supra n. 5, at 1374 n. 157.
67. See Elizabeth Barker Brandt, Estate of Kirk: Mortmain. Perpetuities. Extrinsic
Evidence. Aaargh!, 39 Advocate (newsletter of the Idaho State Bar) 21, 24 (July 1996).
68. See infra pt. V (discussing that extrinsic evidence should be admissible to deter
future harm).
69. 48 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d Existence of Attorney-Client Relationship 525
(1987). The existence of an attorney-client relationship involves a question of fact.
Courts will find an attorney-client relationship where there is a contract for legal
services between particular parties or a gratuitous undertaking. Robinson v. Benton,
842 So. 2d 631, 635 (Ala. 2002) (citing Williams v. Jackson Co., 359 So. 2d 798 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1978)). Upon the establishment of an attorney-client relationship, a
fiduciary responsibility exists and carries with it the requirement of utmost good faith
and loyalty. See e.g. Homa v. Friendly Mobile Manor. Inc., 612 A.2d 322, 327 (Md.
App. 1992). Most of the duties flowing from the client-lawyer relationship attach
immediately. Once it is determined that a duty is owed by the attorney to the client, the
general rule with respect to the liability of an attorney for failure to properly perform
his or her duties, is that the attorney is required to render ordinary skill in the
performance of the tasks which he or she undertakes. Blair v. lng, 21 P.3d 452, 460
(Haw. 2001) (citing Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1961)); see also Model R. of
Prof. Conduct 1.\, 1.3 & 1.7 (ABA 2003) (discussing the relevant duties of particular
importance in the estate-planning context).
70. See Model R. of Prof. Conduct R. 1.\, 1.3, 1.7.
71. See supra nn. 2-3 (discussing what is required to prepare a valid will and trust).
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testamentary wishes, provided these wishes fall within legal
boundaries. Various limitations are imposed on the testator's wishes,
such as provisions that violate public policy; 72 provisions that attempt
to defeat the spouse's elective share; 73 and provisions drafted in
74
violation of the rule against perpetuities.
To the extent the client
desires to incorporate provisions beyond legal parameters, the attorne.rs
is obligated to advise the client as to the risks associated therewith. 5
Furthermore, the attorney's failure to counsel the client on legal
76
boundaries could result in a malpractice action.
Other than a jurisdiction's statutory
formalities 77
or
requirements,78 there are no requirements or mandatory procedures for
the preparation of a will or trust. Various obligations associated with
the preparation of a will have developed as case law. One court stated

when an attorney is hired to prepare a will [or draft a revocable
trust], the attorney's obligation is to: (1) Inquire into the client's
heirs at law,19 (2) offer a proper explanation, (3) advise the client
72. Will provisions requiring waste, or conditioned on the beneficiary obtaining a
divorce, are examples of provisions which violate public policy. See In re Estate of
Pace, 400 N.Y.S.2d 488, 492 (\977) (stating that a will provision, which directed the
fiduciary to demolish two houses located on testator's property, violated public policy
and was not enforceable, because the cost of demolition, annual property taxes, and
maintenance without the benefit of rental income to offset such losses was considered
waste); see also Fineman v. C. Natl. Bank of Cleveland, 175 N.E.2d 837,841 (Ohio
App. 8th Dist. 1961) (holding that the public policy of Ohio does not countenance a
bequest or device conditioned on the beneficiary's obtaining a separation or divorce
from his wife).
73. See Angela M. Vallario, Spousal Election: Suggested Equitable Reform for the
Division of Property at Death, 52 Cath. U. L. Rev. 519, 530 nn. 46-47 (2003)
(providing a listing of jurisdictions with elective share statutes).
74. See generally John Chipman Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities, § 201, 191
(Roland Grayed., 4th ed., Little, Brown and Co. 1942). See also Angela M. Vallario,
Death By A Thousand Cuts: The Rule Against Perpetuities, 25 J. Legis. 141, 156
(1999).
75. For example, should the testator wish to disinherit his or her estranged spouse,
the attorney is obligated to advise the client of the surviving spouse's right to file an
election against the will and frustrate his or her testamentary plan. See Vallario, supra
n 73, at 541-42.
76. See Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 686 (Cal. 1961) (allowing a malpractice
action by the will beneficiaries for the attorney's failure to draft a trust in accordance
with the rule against perpetuities).
77. See supra n. 2 (noting the formality requirements of a will).
78. See supra n. 3 (noting the requirements of a trust).
79. Dobris, supra n. 2, at 7. Heirs are determined at one's death as the takers under
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as to his or her heirs at law, (4) explain the significance of
including or excluding all heirs at law in a will, and (5) prepare a
will according to the client's [legal] directions. 8o

If essential steps and procedures are followed, the patent ambiguity
problem discussed herein could be minimized. Thus, this article
suggests that when an attorney renders estate-planning services, he or
she should incorporate detailed steps and procedures which do not
overly burden the estate-planner and will likely result in testamentary
documents being prepared free from patent defects.
A. ESSENTIAL STEPS AND PROCEDURES THAT SHOULD
BE FOLLOWED IN THE PREPARATION OF
TESTAMENTARY DOCUMENTS

There are several steps in the preparation of testamentary
documents, which if incorporated into one's legal practice would
achieve the attorney's duty to draft testamentary documents free from
patent ambiguities. As the following sections detail, in the preparation
of a will or revocable trust, the attorney must obtain information
regarding the client, his heirs, and legatees. 8l He or she then must
frepare and review the documents,82 supervise the execution process,
84 Additionally, duties associated with the
3 and implement the plan.

the decedent's intestacy statute. The decedent's heirs are not known when the testator
is preparing his will. Therefore, this inquiry should include blood relatives such as
descendants, ancestors and collaterals. Additional potential heirs, including one's
fiancee and loved ones, should be explored with the client. Id.
80. Leak-Gilbert v. Fahle, 55 P.3d 1054, 1062, 1056 (Okla. 2002) (holding that
absent the testator's request, the attorney had no duty to investigate the testator's heirs
where four grand-children from the testator's deceased son were considered pretermitted heirs and entitled to inherit).
81. Infra pt. I1I.A.1. (discussing the obtain information step of the estate-planning
process).
82. Infra pt. I1I.A.2. (discussing the preparation and review step of the estateplanning process. Carelessness in the preparation and review stage is likely the culprit
for a testamentary document with a patent ambiguity).
83. Infra pt. I1I.A.3. (discussing the will or trust execution ceremony and
responsibilities associated therewith).
84. In the case of a revocable trust, the plan is implemented with the transfer of
assets during the settlor's life so that upon his or her death these non-probate assets
pass in accordance with the trust terms.
Infra pt. III.A.4. (discussing the
implementation process).
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will's safekeeping and client communication are oftentimes part of the
85
estate-planning process.

1. Obtaining Information
The estate-planning process commences with the collection of
information from the client. The attorney should obtain complete and
accurate information regarding relevant matters such as domicile,86
family members and loved ones, the title and value of probate and nonprobate property, and beneficiary designations on contract
arrangements such as life insurance policies, annuities, and retirement
plans. Additionally, information such as citizenship,87 joint owners of
88
jointly held property, and contribution components are essential to
89
providing competent estate-planning services.
85. Dobris, supra n. 2, at 218. Ancillary to estate-planning services are issues of
the document's safekeeping and continued client communication. The attorney should
advise his or her client with respect to appropriate safekeeping options and risks
associated therewith. This advice is best conveyed by cover letter and reiterated orally
at the execution ceremony. Id.
No jurisdiction imposes a duty of continued client communication on the estateplanning attorney after the rendering of estate-planning services. Although, changes in
the law may warrant alterations to one's testamentary documents. Absent an ongoing
relationship, attorneys are not responsible for advising clients to revisit their estate
plans. For example, many estate plans implemented aggressive inter vivos gifting
programs based on the $600,000 Federal exemption amount. LRC. § 2010 (1986).
These plans should be re-examined in light of the scheduled increases. LR.C. § 2010
(2004).
Another more recent example includes the attorney's obligation to contact client due to
legislative changes. In 2004, the Federal exemption amount is $1,500,000 but some
states capped the state estate tax at $1,000,000. See Md. Sen. 508, 2004 Gen.
Assembly, Reg. Sess. (2004). After the state legislation was enacted, many estate plans
need to be amended. Yet, an attorney is not under an obligation to notify estateplanning clients to revisit their estate-plans in light of the legislative changes. Even if
the attorney retains the original testamentary document, it is unlikely that any court
would impose a general duty of continued communication on the attomey-safekeeper.
Id.
86. Dukeminier & Johanson, supra n. 10, at 242.
87. See Dobris, supra n. 2, at 461; LR.C. § 2001(a) (West 2002). The imposition of
the Federal transfer tax is imposed on every decedent who is a citizen or resident of the
United States. LR.C. § 2056(d)(I). If the surviving spouse of the decedent is not a
United States citizen the marital deduction is disallowed. Id.
88. The contribution of consideration towards jointly held property is important in
determining the property of the estate for Federal estate tax purposes. See I.R.C § 2040
(stating there shall be excepted [from the value of joint property] such part of the value
of such property as is proportionate to the consideration furnished by such other
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Much of this information is obtained from a client-prepared form
and/or client interview. Generally, the client-provided information is
relied upon and not verified by the attomey.90 In most cases, to impose
a duty of verification would "expand the obligation of a lawyer who
drafts a will beyond reasonable limits,,,91 would ;revent the attorney
from providing reliable and economical services,9 and would place an
unreasonable burden on the attorney.93 If estate-planning attorneys are
required to verify client-provided information or hire employees to do
so, the cost of providing this service will be passed onto the client, thus
making it too expensive for many individuals. Although not the norm,
94
a duty to investigate may be imposed if a client requests investigation
95
or if circumstances demonstrate otherwise.
For example, the duty of
inquiry may be imposed on the attorney if the client becomes
reasonably confused as to what information is to be provided.

person).
89. Model R. of Prof. Conduct 1.1 (ABA 2003).
90. Leak-Gilbert v. Fahle, 55 P.3d 1054, 1057-58 (Okla. 2002) (holding that where
decedent's heirs sued decedent's lawyer for not including them in decedent's will the
lawyer was not obligated to conduct an independent investigation of the decedent's
heirs, apart from the information provided to the lawyer by the decedent, unless
requested to do so).
91. Id. at 1058 (citing Stangland v. Brock, 747 P.2d 464, 469 (Wash. 1987)). See
Ventura County Humane Society v. Holloway, 115 Cal. Rptr. 464, 469 (App. 1st Dist.
1974) (holding that, where the drafter was liable for costs incurred as a result of a latent
ambiguity, the attorney could not be accountable for using certain words and that to
impose such a burden on the attorney would amount to an insurmountable burden).
92. Leak-Gilbert, 55 P.3d at 1058.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1057.
95. See Butler v. State Bar of Cal., 721 P.2d 585 (Cal. 1986). In Butler, the Court

stated "while an attorney may often rely upon statements made by the client without
further investigation, circumstances known to the attorney may require an
investigation." Id. at 588. Butler, involved an estate administration where the personal
representative informed the attorney that the estate had only non-probate assets. [d. at
586. Based on that information the attorney stated a probate proceeding was not
necessary. !d. at 586-87. In review of the State Bar of California's recommendation
for suspension, the Court found the attorney failed to make adequate inquiry, failed to
obtain relevant information to probate the estate and failed to communicate adequately
with the beneficiary. Id. at 588-89.
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2. Prepare and Review
Once the information is obtained, the estate-planning attorney has
a duty to draft a valid testamentary document that accurately reflects
the testator's intent,96 This duty includes an obligation to clarify any
97
uncertainties in the client-provided information, explain tax and nontax ramifications of the testator's wishes, and draft the document in
98
99
accordance with statutory formalities
and/or legal requirements.
On occasion, courts impose a duty to examine potential tax
lOO
problems.
In most instances, the court's reluctance to incorporate
tax-incentive provisions hinges on the need to honor the testator's
testamentary scheme that is changed when tax provisions are
incorporated into the testamentary document, 101
For example,
objectively, most clients take advantage of the Federal exemption
amount by placing that amount in a credit shelter trust, and making a

96. See supra n. 5 (discussing the importance of the testator's intent).
97. Horne v. Peckham, 158 Cal. Rptr. 714, 720 (App. 3d Dist. 1979) (stating that
the general practitioner has a duty to refer his client to a specialist or recommend the
assistance of a specialist if under the circumstances a reasonably careful and skillful
practitioner would do so).
98. See Dobris, supra n. 2 (explaining that the testamentary document must satisfy
the requirements of the jurisdiction in which the decedent is domiciled as of his or her
date of death); but see Md. Ests. & Trust Code Ann. § 4-104(3) (1974) (discussing that
savings statutes recognize the testamentary document as being valid provided the
document is valid in the jurisdiction in which it was executed).
99. See Dobris, supra n. 2, at 473-490 (explaining that a valid trust requires
ascertainable beneficiary, present intent, legal purpose, and resolution).
100. Bucquet v. Livingston, 129 Cal. Rptr. 514, 518-21 (App. 1st Dist. 1976)
(holding that knowledge of potential tax problems inherent in general powers of
appointment in a trust were within the ambit of a reasonably competent and diligent
practitioner); see also Horne, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 720 (holding that a general practitioner
who acknowledged needing expert assistance regarding tax consequences of the trust
had the duty to "refer his client to a specialist or recommend the assistance of a
specialist if under the circumstances a reasonably careful and skillful practitioner
would do so); but see Barner v. Sheldon, 678 A.2d 767 (N.J. Super. L.1995) (holding
that an attorney who drafted the will and who was subsequently appointed as attorney
for estate by executrix did not owe duty to inform beneficiaries (testator's children)
that they had right to disclaim their share of testator's estate in favor of their mother,
which allegedly would have resulted in avoidance or diminution of Federal estate
taxes).
101. See I.R.C. §§ 2010, 2056 (West 2004) (noting that the most common taxincentive provision is the married testator's ability to employ basic Federal estate tax
savings provisions with a credit shelter trust and unlimited marital deduction, which
results in the elimination Federal estate taxes on the death of the first spouse).
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conscious decision to engage in such tax planning. 102 If done, the
surviving spouse is prevented from having control over the trust assets.
Thus, the surviving spouse is much more limited than he or she would
be with an outright distribution. Therefore, courts will not infer the
attorney's negligence from the testator's failure to engage in this level
of tax estate planning. 103 The possibility of a valid reason for not using
the credit shelter trust, precludes the court from presuming its absence
is due to the preparer's negligence.
Following the drafting of the testamentary document, the attorney
has an obligation to review the document to insure its validitylO4 and
complies with the testator's wishes. 105 At some point in the process
before execution, documents should be carefully and thoroughly
reviewed by the attorney for patent defects. Although a patent defect
could be discovered by the client prior to the document's execution, the
client's failure to bring an obvious defect to the attorney's attention
should not prevent his or her malpractice recovery.106 To impose this
responsibility on the client would be improper and unfair. Thus, the
client's failure to discover and notify the attorney of the patent defect
does not make the client contributorily negligent. 107
The attorney owes duties to his or her client. 108 The discovery by
the client of the attorney's failure to J'rovide this standard of care
would result in a breach and damages. lo In this instance damages will
likely be limited to the refund of fees. 110 More often, the error is

102. I.R.C. § 2010.
103. Noble v. Bruce, 709 A.2d 1264, 1278 (Md. 1998) (stating that testators do not
always intend to avoid taxes, and in order to do so, the testator's must part with
dominion and control).
104. But see Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685,690 (Cal. 1961) (holding that drafting a
will so that the trust provisions violated the rule against perpetuities did not amount to
negligence).
105. See infra pt. IV.A. (discussing cases where third parties claim the document in
some way failed to comply with the testator's wishes).
106. Knupp v. Schoeber, 1992 WL 182323 at **2-4 (D.C. July 14, 1992) (holding
that where a third party is able to proceed against the negligent attorney, contributory
negligence should not mitigate damages).
107. Id.
108. See supra n. 69 (discussing the establishment of an attorney-client relationship
and the respective duties and responsibilities).
109. Fogel, supra n. 19, at 278.
110. Noble v. Bruce, 709 A.2d 1264, 1278 (Md. 1998) (stating in dicta that the
attorney could correct the will without further compensation or refund his or her fee).
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discovered at the client's death and because of the testator's absence,
courts are reluctant to second guess the testamentary intent and impose
unclear obligations on the attorney. I I I But the existence of a patent
ambiguity is a defect that should have been corrected and could have
been eliminated at this stage of the estate-planning process. The
attorney's failure to render competent services at the preparation and
review stage causes the harm.
3. Execution

The attorney should be involved in the execution of the
testamentary documents so that the attorney has another opportunity to
discover a patent ambiguity. A draft forwarded to the client without an
appropriate explanation of the necessary execution procedures could
result in a malpractice action. I 12 Often, inadequacies in the execution
ceremony lead to an invalid will. 11 3 The attorney must supervise or
adequately inform the client with respect to execution procedures.
These procedures include instructions regarding signature, witnessing,
and safekeeping. 114
Although the execution ceremony seems
straightforward, many problems arise due to inadequate supervision. I IS
Ill. !d. at 1266 (finding that, where a Federal tax exemption was not maximized as
part of the client's testamentary wishes, testators do not always intend to avoid taxes
because doing so requires the testator to part with dominion and control).
112. See Brammer v. Taylor, 338 S.E.2d 207,213 (W. Va. 1985) (holding that nonlawyer's inadequate supervision of execution of codicil was prima facie negligence);
accord State ex reI. Neb. St. B. Assn. v. Butterfield, III N.W.2d 543,546 (Neb. 1961)
(finding that preparation oflegal documents during an attorney's suspension constitutes
"practice of law); Palmer v. Unauth. Prac. Comm. of the St. B. of Tex., 438 S.W.2d
374,376 (Tex. App. 14th Dis!. 1969) (noting that the drafting ofa will and supervising
of its execution constitutes the "practice oflaw").
113. See In re Alleged Will of Ranney, 589 A.2d 1339, 1346 (N.J. 1991) (finding that
the testator's failure to comply with the statutory formalities of signing in the presence
of the two witnesses resulted in his property passing intestate).
114. But see Atty. Grievance Commn. v. Myers, 490 A.2d 231, 233 (Md. 1983)
(illustrating that under certain circumstances an attorney may reasonably believe that
the client is sufficiently sophisticated and reliable to follow her instructions. An
attorney prepared a will without an attestation clause, without signature lines, and
failed to instruct the client properly regarding the manner of execution.).
115. See e.g. Tomkins v. Beckley, 1999 WL 141328 at *3 (Mar. 9,1999) (discussing
whether an attorney breached his duty where a will was never formally executed);
Auric v. ContI. Cas. Co., 331 N.W. 2d 325, 327 (Wis. 1983) (finding that the attorney's
negligence in his supervision of the execution of the will caused damages to the
beneficiaries where a will was invalid for failure to have the required number of

2004

PATENT DEFECTS IN TESTAMENTARY DOCUMENTS

79

The courts tend to find attorney's negligence for flaws in the
statutory formalities. In such a situation, ifthejurisdiction does not fix
the invalid will with substantial compliance,11 the attorney will likely
be liabley7 Similar to the situation of a testamentary document's
failure to comply with statutory formalities, when a patent ambiguity
exists, the attorney should be liable for the consequences of this level
of intolerable carelessness

4. Implementation
After the testamentary document is signed, a will is funded on the
testator's death, whereas a revocable trust is funded during the settlor's
lifetime with the transfer of property to the trustee. Some documents
of transfer, like a deed, must be prepared by an attorney.118 Other
assets, like bank accounts and brokerage accounts, may be transferred
without any assistance. 119 The attorney should, at a minimum, advise
the client on the procedures necessary to implement the trust. 120 The
failure to implement the trust during the settlor's lifetime is oftentimes
the result of the attorney's failure to comply with his or her duties in
rendering estate planning services. But when the attorney's failure to
implement the living trust is discovered at the death of the settlor, the
courts are hesitant to presume that the lack of implementation was the
attorney's fault. Instead, due to the number of potential reasons for the
settlor's failure to implement, a court is likely to justify it due to the
possibility that the settlor had second thoughts. 121

signatures).
116. In re Alleged Will of Ranney, 589 A.2d 1339, 1346 (N.J. 1991).
117. Tomkins v. Beckley, 1999 WL 141328 at **3-4.
118. See e.g. Md. Real Prop. Code Ann. § 3-104(f)(1) (2003).

119. For example, opening accounts in the name of the trust by filling out the
account application, followed by letters of instruction from the client is sufficient to
accomplish this task. George T. Bogert, Trusts § 32 (6th ed., West 2001).
120. See e.g. Fla. B. v. Schramek, 616 So. 2d 979, 987 (Fla. 1993) (finding that a
non-lawyer's failure to implement a living trust forced the decedent's heirs to probate
her estate).
121. See Barcelo v. Elliott, 923 S.W.2d 575,578 (Tex. 1996) Uustifying the defeat of
a testatrix's pour-over will where there was a defective trust because of the
"concomitant questions as to the true intentions of the testator").
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B. COMPETENT REPRESENTATION AMOUNTS TO A DUTY TO DRAFT
TESTAMENTARY DOCUMENTS FREE FROM PATENT AMBIGUITIES

The Model Rules of Professional Conduct require an attorney to
provide his or her client with competent representation. 122 This Ethical
Rule requires the attorney to demonstrate "legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation." 123 The mere existence of a patent ambiguity in a
testamentary document reflects an obvious lack of due care and
departure from competent representation. 124 The patent ambiguity
should not exist and would not exist had the attorney rendered
competent services. Clients have a right to expect competence in the
preparation of their testamentary documents. If it is discovered that the
legal services rendered fell beneath this required standard of care,
clients have recourse against the attorney. Although a violation of this
Ethical Rule does not in and of itself give rise to a cause of action for
negligence nor was it designed to be a basis for civil liability, the
violation "may be evidence ofbreach.,,125

1. Permitted Inference ofNegligence Due to the Existence ofPatent
Ambiguity
This article proposes that the existence of a patent ambiguity
violates Ethical Rule 1.1,126 and from such violation, a permitted
inference of negligence should be drawn. 127 The mere existence of a
patent ambiguity in a testamentary document allows for an inference of
the preparer's negligence. 128 The permitted inference should be
allowed because the patent ambiguity could and should have been
easily avoided with appropriate drafting steps and procedures. 129 The

122. Model R. of Prof. Conduct 1.1 (ABA 2004) (requiring a lawyer to provide
clients competent representation, defined as the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness
and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation).
123. Id.
124. Infra pt. I1I.B.1. (discussing the permitted inference of negligence).
125. See Gillers & Simon, supra n. 16, at 113.
126. Model R. of Prof. Conduct 1.1 (ABA 2004).
127. Michael H. Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence § 301.7 (5th ed., West
2001); McLain, Maryland Evidence § 301:4 (defining permissible inferences as
allowing upon the proof of a basic fact, a second fact to be inferred).
128. Graham, supra n. 127, at § 301.7; McLain, supra n. 127, at § 301:4.
129. Dukeminier & Johanson, supra n. 10, at 409.
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patent error could and should have been discovered in the preparation
and review stage of the estate-planning process. 130 For example, if the
will provision specifically bequeathed real property but failed to
designate the beneficiary, this error should have been caught during the
appropriate review of the will. The client's foreseeable absence and
inability to participate in the action, coupled with the need to provide a
remedy, mandate this permitted inference.
IV. THIRD PARTY CAUSE OF ACTION FOR NEGLIGENCE

A. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR EXTENDING ATTORNEY'S
DUTY TO THIRD PARTIES

Current law does not automatically extend the attorney's duty to
draft testamentary documents free from patent ambiguities to third
parties. However, in order to provide an adequate remedy to those
harmed, this duty must be extended. This extension is necessary
because the attorney's failure to render competent services is likely to
be discovered only after the client's death, which terminates the
attorney-client relationship and the duties attached therewith. Like the
bad conduct exception,131 the existence of a patent ambiguity opens the
door for third party suits. The attorney's gross carelessness that
resulted in a patent ambiguity should permit the third party to proceed.
Baseless claims can be controlled by requiring the third party to show
harm with extrinsic evidence.
B. ACCOUNTABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES
If the document includes a patent ambiguity, the client's absence
presents a unique hurdle for those harmed by the defective drafting.
Third parties are left to determine whether they can sue, justifying the
risks of litigation and funding the suit. Whether a third party can
successfully bring a cause of action against the attorney who prepared
the testamentary document with a patent defect depends on the
jurisdiction.
Current approaches to third party liability in the preparation of
testamentary documents are insufficient and fail to provide a remedy to
130. See supra pt. III. A. 2. (discussing the attorney's duty of care in the preparation
and review stages of the estate-planning process).
131. See infra pt. IV.B.2.a. (defining and describing of the bad conduct exception).
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the third party hanned by the patent ambiguity. 132 This article
classifies those approaches as strict privity,133 strict privity
exceptions,134 or other approaches. 135 The third party's inability to sue
in jurisdictions adhering to the strict privity rule amounts to absolute
immunity. Several jurisdictions require the third party to satisfy a strict
privity exception, which offers little practical relief. The majority of
states have adopted other approaches that allow the third party to sue
but only after he or she satisfies a sufficient number of elements under
the balancing of factors test l36 or proves that he or she is a foreseeable
plaintiff who relied upon the services under the foreseeable reliance
When the attorney's negligence results in a patent
theory. 137
ambiguity, these approaches unnecessarily impose significant burdens
and costs on the third party.
1. Strict Privity
Over one hundred years ago, the United States Supreme Court
held that a third party not in privity138 with an attorney had no cause of
action against the attorney for negligence. 139 The Court stated that
absent privity, the attorney would be exposed to countless claims l40
and would be unable to zealously represent his or her clients.
Although most jurisdictions no longer follow strict privity, a
minority of jurisdictions, 14 1 despite its inequities,142 adhere to strict
132. See infra

pt. IV.B. (discussing the current approaches to accountability to third

parties).
133. See infra pt.
134. See infra pt.
135. See infra pt.

IV.B.1.
IV.B.2.
IV.B.3.
136. See infra pt. IV.B.3.a.
137. See infra pt. IV.B.3.b.

138. Black's Law Dictionary at 1237 (defining pnvlty as "the connection or
relationship between two parties, each having a legally recognized interest in the same
subject matter").
139. Natl. Sav. Bank of D.C. v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195,200 (1879) (finding that, due to
the lack of privity, a lender could not bring a negligence cause of action against an
attorney who was acting on behalf of the real estate loan applicant).
140. [d. at 202.
141. See e.g. Robinson v. Benton, 842 So. 2d 631, 637 (Ala. 2002) (upholding the
rule that a third party cannot sue an attorney without privity, despite the attorney's
admission of fault in failing to destroy a previous will upon the request of his client);
Linck v. Barokas & Martin, 667 P.2d 171, 173 (Ala. 1983) (dismissing complaint of
professional negligence against attorneys brought by deceased widow); Lilyhorn v.
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privity in the situation of estate-planning malpractice. 143 Strict privity
acts as an absolute bar to the cause of action and constitutes immunity
for estate-planning attorneys when the defect is discovered after the
testator's death. Adherence to such a principle in the words of an
English court is striking, because the real harm is caused when "the
only person who has a valid claim has suffered no loss and the only
person who has suffered a loss has no valid claim."I44
a. Justifications for Strict Privity
Proponents of strict privity believe that a greater good is being
served by preserving the attorney's ability to zealously represent clients
without being compromised by the threat of a suit from third parties. 145
In those states following strict privity, it is believed strict privity is
Dier, 335 N.W.2d 554, 555 (Neb. 1983) (stating that no attorney-client privilege
existed between the attorney and the decedent's son with respect to the drafting or
execution of the decedent's will and that the duty to exercise reasonable care and skill
that an attorney ordinarily owed his client did not extend to third parties); Kramer v.
Be/fi, 482 N'y.S.2d 898, 900 (App. Div. 1984) (applying New York's strict privity
doctrine, the court denied standing to the beneficiary of a decedent's estate to sue the
attorney for the executor for allegedly failing to give tax advice that would have saved
estate taxes); Barcelo v. Elliot, 923 S.W.2d 575, 579 (Tex. 1996) (finding that an
attorney owed a duty of care only to his client and not to third parties who may have
been damaged by defendant's negligent representation of the client).
142. See infra pt. IV.B.l.b.
143. Robinson, 842 So.2d at 637.
144. Ross v. Caunters, 3 All Eng. Reports 580, 583 (Chancery Div. 1979) (holding
that the beneficiaries' lack of privity of contract with the attorney-drafter of the will
was no bar to an action for negligence). The English court observed:
[I]n broad terms, the question is whether solicitors who prepare a will are
liable to a beneficiary under it if, through their negligence, the gift to the
beneficiary is void. The solicitors are liable, of course, to the testator or his
estate for a breach of the duty that they owed to him, though as he has
suffered no financial loss it seems that his estate could recover no more than
nominal damages. Yet it is said that however careless the solicitors were,
they owed no duty to the beneficiary, and so they cannot be liable to her. If
this is right, the result is striking. The only person who has a valid claim has
suffered no loss, and the only person who has suffered a loss has no valid
claim.
Id.
145. Barcelo, 923 S.W.2d at 577-579 (The court stated that an attorney retained by a
testator to draft a trust owed no professional duty of care to persons named as
beneficiaries thus barring a malpractice suit when the trust was declared invalid. The
court reasoned that without this privity barrier, clients would lose control over the
attorney-client relationship and attorneys would be subject to unlimited liability.).
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necessary to: (1) Prevent frivolous claims by beneficiaries who did not
benefit under the will as they believed they should, (2) protect the
attorney-client relationship, (3) prevent the attorney from dividing his
loyalties between the client and intended beneficiary,146 (4) prevent the
drafting-attorney from being subject to unlimited liability,147 (5)
prevent a conflict of interest during the estate-planning process that
would limit the attorney's ability to represent the client zealously, 148
and (6) protect the deceased testator's intentions rather than allowing
beneficiaries to doubt them. 149 Strict privity supporters believe that "in
drafting testamentary instruments at the behest of a client, an attorney
should not be burdened with potential liability to possible beneficiaries
of such instrurnents.,,150
b. Inequities of Strict Privity
These public policy arguments favoring strict pnvlty fail to
address the detrimental impact such a rule has on the third party who is
left without recourse to pursue his or her remedy. Strict privity
operates as an absolute bar regardless of the facts and circumstances.
This harsh rule allows carelessness to occur and continue to occur in
the preparation of testamentary documents because when the patent
defect is discovered after the testator's death there is no risk of
malpractice. 151
In states following strict privity, there is no
accountability for sloppy and careless drafting. Without accountability

146. Craig D. Martin, Student Author, Liability of Attorneys to Non-Clients: When
Does a Duty to Non-Clients Arise?, 23 J. Leg. Prof. 273, 279 (1999) (noting that
enacting an exception to the strict privity requirement "would subject attorneys to suits
by heirs who simply did not receive what they believed to be their due share under the
will or trust. This potential tort liability to third parties would create a conflict during
the estate planning process, dividing the attorney's loyalty between his or her client and
the third-party beneficiaries.").
147. Barcelo, 923 S.W.2d at 577.
148. Id. at 578.
149. Id. at 577-78; Martin, supra n. 146, at 279.
150. Glover v. Southard, 894 P.2d 21, 25 (Colo. App. Div. 2 1994) (holding that a
bank's attorney, who drafted a trust agreement for the decedent and later amended the
testator's will to leave the entire estate to the beneficiaries, but never amended the trust,
had no duty to the beneficiaries).
151. See generally id. (illustrating strict privity jurisdictions tendency to make
negligent estate planners immune from liability when the negligence is discovered after
the death of his or her client).
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to third parties, attorneys will not clean up practices or prevent future
harm.
Despite the justification for strict privity,152 adherence to such a
rule in the estate-planning area has a detrimental affect on third parties
and therefore should not be followed. Most jurisdictions agree and
have developed exceptions 153 or other rules 154 to provide third parties
with an avenue for pursuing a remedy.

2. Strict Privity Exceptions
Some jurisdictions have softened the consequences of strict
privity by making narrow strict privity exceptions for defective
155
testamentary documents.
This article divides the strict privity
exceptions into three groups: (1) The bad conduct exception,156 (2) the
third-party beneficiary exception,157 and (3) the frustrated intent
exception. 158

152. See supra pt. IV.B.La.
153. See infra pt. IV.B.2. (discussing strict privity exceptions).
154. See infra pt. IV.B.3. (discussing other approaches developed to accommodate
third parties).
155. E.g. Needham v. Hamilton, 459 A.2d 1060, 1062 (D.C. 1983) (holding that the
requirement of privity did not extend to a malpractice suit brought by the intended
beneficiary of a will against the attorneys who drafted it); Simpson v. Calivas, 650
A.2d 318, 322 (N.H. 1994) (holding that although there was no privity between a
drafting lawyer and an intended beneficiary, the obvious foreseeability of injury to the
beneficiary demanded an exception to the privity rule); Simon v. Zipperstein, 512
N.E.2d 636, 638 (Ohio 1987) (stating that generally, an attorney is immune from
liability to third persons unless that attorney acted maliciously).
156. E.g. McDonald v. Pettus, 988 S.W.2d 9, 14 (Ark. 1999) (indicating that one
exception to the lawyer-immunity statute includes any statement by the attorney that
constitutes fraud); accord Zipperstein, 512 N.E.2d at 638; Brooks v. Zebre, 792 P.2d
196,201-202 (Wyo. 1990).
157. E.g. Walker v. Lawson, 514 N.E.2d 629, 633 (Ind. App. 1987) (attorney who
drafts a will owes a fiduciary duty to the beneficiary because ordinary principles of
negligence apply in a cause of action for malpractice for the known intended
beneficiaries of a testamentary scheme); Pizel v. Zuspann, 795 P.2d 42, 48 (Kan. 1990)
(holding that the appellant was entitled to bring suit as there was no dispute that
appellant was a foreseeable beneficiary to the trust); Killingsworth v. Schlater, 292 So.
2d 536, 543 (La. 1973) (finding that the legatees were entitled to recover damages as
third-party beneficiaries for breach of the attorney's stipulation to legally draft the
will); Noble v. Bruce, 709 A.2d 1264, 1272 (Md. 1998) (requiring plaintiff to prove
direct employment relationship or that he or she was the intended third-party
beneficiary under the narrow exception to the strict privity requirement); Calivas, 650
A.2d at 322 (holding that "although there [was] no privity between a drafting attorney
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a. Bad Conduct Exception
Courts willingly deviate from strict privity when the attorney's
conduct is fraudulent, malicious,159 or improper. 160 Exceptions to
strict privity are also made for collusion,161 and intentional

and an intended beneficiary, the obvious foreseeability of injury to the beneficiary
demand[ed] an exception to the privity rule"); Leak-Gilbert v. Fahle, 55 P.3d 1054,
1062 (Okla. 2002) (extending a duty created by a contract to a third party when the
contract is made expressly for the benefit of a third-party); Roberts v. Fearey, 986 P.2d
690, 693 (Or. App. 1999) (finding a duty to non-clients when the plaintiff was the
"intended" third-party beneficiary of the attorney's relationship with a client); Guy v.
Liederbach, 459 A.2d 744, 746 (Pa. 1983) (holding that a beneficiary had a cause of
action against the attorney who drafted the will based either on a negligence or a thirdparty beneficiary theory); Rutter v. Jones, 568 S.E.2d 693, 695 (Va. 2002) (requiring
that in order to proceed on a third-party beneficiary contract theory, the party claiming
the benefit must show that the parties to a contract clearly and definitely intended to
confer a benefit upon him).
158. See e.g. Arnold v. Carmichael, 524 So. 2d 464, 466 (Fla. 1st Dist. App. 1988)
(finding that an attorney who had redrafted will, but had omitted a residuary clause,
was the proximate cause for the loss to intended testamentary beneficiaries); Harrigfeld
v. Hancock, 364 F.3d 1024, 1024 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that an attorney preparing
testamentary instruments owes a duty to the named beneficiaries to effectuate the
testator's intent as expressed in the testamentary instruments); Schreiner v. Scoville,
410 N.W.2d 679, 683 (Iowa 1987) (stating that a cause of action ordinarily arises only
when as a direct result of the lawyer's professional negligence, the testator's intent as
expressed in the testamentary instruments is frustrated in whole or in part, and the
beneficiary's interest in the estate is either lost, diminished, or unrealized); Ginther v.
Zimmerman, 491 N.W.2d 282, 286 (Mich. App. 1992) (holding that "where the intent
of the testator as expressed in the testamentary instrument is not frustrated, an attorney
owes no duty that will give rise to a cause of action to persons not named in the
instrument").
159. See e.g., Glover v. Southard, 894 P.2d 21,23 (Colo. App. Div. 21994) (finding
that an attorney is not liable to non-client absent fraudulent or malicious conduct);
Luikart v. Miller, 48 S.W.2d 867, 871 (Mo. 1932) (defining malice as the intentional
doing of a wrongful act without just cause or excuse, with the intent to inflict injury or
under circumstances that the law will imply an evil intent).
160. See Brainerd Dispatch Newsp. Co. v. Crow Wing County, 264 N.W. 779, 780
(Minn.1936) (defining fraud and collusion); see also Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-310
(1987 & Supp. 2003) (providing statutory provisions that allow a third party to sue an
attorney for negligence when the attorney's conduct constitutes fraud or intentional
misrepresentation. Fraud is defined as an intentional perversion of the truth for the
purpose of inducing another in reliance upon it, to part with some valuable thing
belonging to him.).
161. See Noble v. Bruce, 709 A.2d 1264, 1268 (Md. App. 1997) (discussing an
attorney's liability to third parties when fraud, collusion, or malice exists).
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misrepresentation. 162 This article has designated these situations as the
"bad conduct exception" because they involve inexcusable conduct by
the attorney. The bad conduct exception only provides third parties
with an avenue for recovery when the third party was a victim of the
attorney's bad behavior. Thus, the bad conduct exception rewards third
parties while punishing the attorney for his or her actions. The bad
conduct exception is aimed at deterring bad conduct and echoes the
view that such conduct should not and will not be tolerated. Thus, by
engaging in bad conduct, the attorney extends his or her duty of care to
the third party. 163 The bad conduct exception requires an intentional
component to the attorney's actions or inactions that is absent when a
patent ambiguity is at issue. l64
This article's proposal is consistent with the theory of third party
accountability used for the bad conduct exception. Like the bad
conduct exception, when an attorney's negligence escalates to the level
that results in a testamentary document that is prepared with a patent
defect, third parties should be provided with an avenue to pursue
recovery. It is only with this level of accountability that future harm
will be deterred.
b. Third-Party Beneficiary Exception 165
When the third party can show that he or she was closely
connected to the services rendered, jurisdictions are willing to extend
the duty of care to those third parties. 166 Jurisdictions justify this
exception with a variety of terms referring to the third party as the

162. See generally Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-310 (defining intentional
misrepresentation as a false representation of a matter of fact that deceives and is
intended to deceive another so that he or she acts upon it to his or her legal injury).
163. Donahue v. Shughart, 900 S.W.2d 624, 628 (Mo. 1995) (finding that the
pleadings were sufficient to establish that attorneys owed a duty to non-clients who
were intended recipients of client's gifts causa mortis and supported a legal malpractice
action by the non-clients against the attorneys).
164. Although a patent ambiguity could result from an intentional act, such as the
attorney's deliberate failure to designate an intended beneficiary, that situation is
beyond the scope of this discussion.
165. Many courts use the term third-party beneficiary in their analysis of the privity
cases. The classification of this strict privity exception does not mirror that discussion.
See infra pt. IV.B.3.a. (discussing the elements of the balancing of factors test).
166. Supra n. 157 (discussing cases following third-party beneficiary exception).
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"identified beneficiary,,167 or requiring the third party to establish he or
she was the "direct purpose of the estate planning transaction.,,168 By
requiring the third party to establish this sufficient connection to the
169
services rendered, the likelihood of frivolous suits is lessened.
However, by imposing such requirements, the third party harmed by
the patent ambiguity is oftentimes no better served. For example, a
third party harmed by a will with a patent ambiguity that fails to
170
identify that third party will be unable to satisfy this exception.
In
the situation of non-identified property,171 or duplication, 72 the third
party faces a significant burden in order to satisfy the third party
beneficiary exception because courts have created a patchwork of rules
and terms,173 with little uniformity.174 This patchwork of law and

167. See e.g. Glover v. Southard, 894 P.2d 21, 24 (Colo. App. Div. 2 1994);
Needham v. Hamilton, 459 A.2d 1060, 1062 (D.C. 1983).
168. Noble v. Bruce, 709 A.2d 1264, 1272 (Md. 1998) (holding that the client's
intent to benefit the non-client must be a direct purpose of the transaction or the
attorney-client relationship in order for the non-client to be considered a third-party
beneficiary).
169. See Martin, supra n. 146, at 279 (discussing that if an exception to the strict
privity requirement is enacted, additional requirements on third parties would be
necessary to prevent frivolous suits).
170. See Knupp v. D.C., 578 A.2d 702, 703, 705 (D.C. 1990) In Knupp, the patent
ambiguity was a disposition of the residual estate to the person designated in the eighth
paragraph of the will. Paragraph eight made a personal representative appointment and
did not refer to the disposition of the testator's residual estate. The appointed personal
representative was the person who claimed harm as a result of the patent defect but he
would not have been able to satisty the third-party exception because he was not an
identified beneficiary. !d. at 703.
171. Wilson v. First Florida Bank, 498 So. 2d 1289, 1291 (Fla. 2d Dist. App. 1986).
172. Succession ofNeff, 716 So. 2d 410, 410-411 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1998).
173. See Needham v. Hamilton, 459 A.2d 1060, 1062-63 (D.C. 1983) (requiring the
third party to be the "direct and intended" beneficiary of the attorney-client
relationship). See Pizel v. Zuspann, 795 P.2d 42, 49 (Kan. 1990) (requiring the third
party claimant to be a "foreseeable" third party); Flaherty v. Weinberg, 492 A.2d 618,
625 (Md. 1985) (establishing the rule that third party recovery in an attorney
malpractice case is whether the intent of the client to benefit the third party actually
existed, not whether the client could have intended to benefit third party); Simpson v.
Calivas, 650 A.2d 318, 321 (N.H. 1994) (referencing this exception as an "intended"
beneficiary).
174. See In re Sandersfeld Estate, 9 Cal. Rptr. 447 (App. 4th Dist. 1960) (holding
that the meaning of the word "home" was a latent ambiguity and allowed extrinsic
evidence); see also Carlisle v. Est. of Carlisle, 252 So. 2d 894, 895 (Miss. 1971)
(admitting extrinsic evidence even though that the uncertainty of the word "home" was
labeled a patent ambiguity).
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terms further adds to the difficulties faced by the third party in bringing
suit under this exception.
c. Frustrated Intent Exception
Other jurisdictions have carved out a narrow exception for patent
defects if the error contradicts the testator's expressed intent. This
exception is sometimes referred to as the "Florida-Iowa exception,,,175
deviates from strict privity when the testamentary intent as "expressed
in the testamentary instruments" is frustrated. 176 This rule most often
applies where there are errors in the execution of the testamentary
document. 177 For example, in order for this exception to provide an
avenue for recovery to a third party harmed by a patent ambiguity, the
testamentary document would require a statement such as "I intend to
benefit my daughter," followed by a legacy with no designated
beneficiary. It is difficult to imagine why an attorney who would be
careless enough to prepare a testamentary document with a patent
ambiguif( would incorporate non-required direct statements of
intent. 17 Thus, this exception will not likely provide the third party
with recourse when the defective document includes a patent
ambiguity.
When the testamentary document is patently defective, the strict
privity exceptions are insufficient and unlikely to adequately protect
third parties harmed by an attorney's carelessness. 179 Not one case that
175. Fogel, supra n. 19, at 262-263 (discussing the Florida-Iowa rule allowing a
beneficiary to maintain a cause of action against the estate-planning attorney only if the
client's intent, as expressed in the will or other document, is frustrated).
176. See Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 364 F.3d 1024, 1024 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that
an attorney preparing testamentary instruments owes a duty to the beneficiaries named
or identified therein to prepare such instruments, and if requested by the testator, to
have them properly executed so as to effectuate the testator's intent as expressed in the
testamentary instruments).
177. Fogel, supra n. 19, at 333 (discussing the types of errors more likely to satisfy
this exception).
178. See Cal. Prob. Code Ann. § 6100 (West 1991 & Supp. 2004); N.Y. Est. Powers
& Trusts L. § 3-21 (McKinney 1998 & Supp. 2004) (explaining that statements of
intent are not statutorily required).
179. See e.g. Glover v. Southard, 894 P.2d 21, 24-25 (Colo. App. Div. 2 1994)
(deciding that attorney who drafted decedent's will and trust owed no duty to intended
beneficiaries and, thus, beneficiaries could not assert legal malpractice claim based on
alleged failure to amend gift provisions of will in accordance with amendments made
to trust); Needham v. Hamilton, 459 A.2d 1060, 1062 (D.C. 1983) (finding that "the
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applied these narrow exceptions involved a patent ambiguity.180 This
suggests that third parties harmed by a patent defect have no greater
chance to recover under the strict privity exceptions than they have
under strict privity.

3. Other Approaches Developed to Accommodate Third Parties
a. Balancing of Factors Test

A majority of jurisdictions have abandoned strict privity and strict
181
privity exceptions for the "balancing of factors" test.
This test
considers a number of criteria in determining whether a duty is owed
by the attorney to a third party. The California Supreme Court
developed this test and was the first to deviate from the inequitable
consequences of strict privity.182 The factors to be considered are: (1)
The extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff,
interests of the testatrix and the intended beneficiary with regard to the proper drafting
and execution of the will were the same"); Noble v. Bruce, 709 A.2d 1264, 1276 (Md.
1998) (stating that the non-client must allege and prove that the intent of the client to
benefit the non-client was a direct purpose of the transaction or relationship. In this
situation, the test for third party recovery is whether the intent to benefit actually
existed, not whether there could have been an intent to benefit the third party.); but see
Donahue v. Shughart, 900 S.W.2d 624, 628 (Mo. 1995) (finding that under a thirdparty beneficiary theory it is difficult to conceive of a situation where the lawyer will
be held liable for a failed gift or testamentary transfer while the client is still living and
competent).
180. Fogel, supra n. 19, at 283-293 (discussing the Florida-Iowa Rule and cases
where this exception failed).
181. E.g. Capitol Indem. Corp. v. Fleming, 58 P.3d 965, 967 (Ariz. App. Div. 2,
2002); Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (Cal. 1958); Glover v. Southard, 894 P.2d
21; Blair v. lng, 21 P.3d 452, 463 (Haw. 2001); Marker v. Greenberg, 313 N.W.2d 4,5
(Minn. 1981); Donahue v. Shughart, 900 S.W.2d 624, 627 (Mo. 1995); Albright v.
Burns, 503 A.2d 386,390 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1986); Wisdom v. Neal, 568 F. Supp.
4, 7 (D.N.M. 1982); Jenkins v. Wheeler, 316 S.E.2d 354, 357 (N.c. App. 1984); Am.
Kennel Club Museum of the Dog v. Edwards & Angell, LLP, 2002 R.I. Super. LEXIS
104 at *23 (July 26, 2002); Persche v. Jones, 387 N.W.2d 32, 35 (S.D. 1986); Tomkins
v. Beckley, 1999 Wash. App. LEXIS 443 at **11-12 (Mar. 9, 1999); Brammer v.
Taylor, 338 S.E.2d 207, 213 (W. Va. 1985); and Auric v. Conti. Cas. Co., 331 N.W.2d
325,329 (Wis. 1983).
182. Biakanja, 320 P.2d at 17, 19 (finding that where a notary public prepared an
invalid will and caused the sole beneficiary named in the will to receive only oneeighth of the estate by intestate succession, the notary public had a duty to exercise due
care to protect sole beneficiary from injury and her negligence was the direct cause of
beneficiary's loss).
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(2) the foreseeability of the hann to the plaintiff, (3) the degree of
certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, (4) the closeness of the
connection between the attorney's conduct and the injury suffered, (5)
the moral blame attached to the attorney's conduct, and (6) the policy
of preventing future hann. 183 Several years later, the California court,
in Lucas v. Hamm, 184 applied these factors to an attorney malpractice
case involving a negligence cause of action brought by will
beneficiaries against the drafting attorney. In Lucas, the Court added
an additional factor, which recognized that liability in such cases would
not impose an undue burden on the legal profession. 18S In its
justification for changing California's law, the Court recognized that
without extending an attorney's duty of care to third parties in the
estate-planning setting "no one would [ever] be able to recover.,,186
In recent years, other states have recognized the need to expand
from strict privity or strict privity exceptions allowing third parties to
sue attorneys in malpractice. 187 In reaching their decision, the courts
183. Id.atI9.
184. Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 688 (Cal. 1961) (holding that the lack of privity
between the beneficiaries of a will and the attorney drafting the will did not preclude
the beneficiaries from maintaining an action in tort for negligence in drafting the will
because the extension of liability in the estate-planning setting would not be unduly
burdensome).
185. /d.
186. Id. (finding that the relationship between the testator and the attorney was to
provide the testator with a means by which he could transfer property to beneficiaries.
If the testator's intent is frustrated due to negligent drafting by the attorney, and the
intended beneficiaries are not able to maintain a cause of action, no one would be able
to recover.).
187. See Capitol Indem. Corp. v. Fleming, 58 P.3d 965, 967 (Ariz. App. Div. 2,
2002). In Fleming, the court recognized public policy concerns and the importance of
allowing the balancing of factors to determine whether or not an attorney was liable to
an individual not in privity with him. Id. The Arizona courts balance the California
factors which are: "(1) [T]he extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the
plaintiff, (2) the foreseeability of harm to him, (3) the degree of certainty that the
plaintiff suffered injury, (4) the closeness of the connection between the defendant's
conduct and the injuries suffered, (5) the moral blame attached to the defendant's
conduct, and (6) the policy of preventing future harm." /d.; Donahue v. Shughart, 900
S.W. 2d 624,629 (Mo. 1995) In Donahue, the court recognized the California test and
acknowledged in Missouri there was no case law in which a third-party beneficiary had
a cause of action against the attorney for negligence. The court then outlined the
factors to be considered: "(1) [T]he existence of a specific intent by the client that the
purpose of the attorney's services were to benefit the plaintiffs, (2) the foreseeability of
the harm to the plaintiffs as a result of the attorney's negligence, (3) the degree of
certainty that the plaintiffs will suffer injury from attorney misconduct, (4) the
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also evaluated the language set forth in section 51 (3) of the
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, which states that
[a] lawyer owes a duty of care ... to a third party when and to the
extent that: (a) The lawyer knows that a client intends, as one of
the primary objectives of the representation, the lawyer's services
to benefit the third party; (b) such a duty would not significantly
impair the lawyer's performance of obligations to the client; and
c) the absence of such a duty would make enforcement of those
obligations to the client unlikely. ISS
Although public policy warrants a departure from the harsh
consequences of strict privity, the balancing of factors test is not
without substantial cost to the injured third party.189 This test requires
the third party to make a case within a case to recover from the
attorney. First, the third party is required to prove he or she is entitled
to bring the cause of action by satisfying a sufficient number of
elements under this test. If successful, the third party may proceed
with the malpractice action. Unfortunately, the series of factors
examined by the various courts have not been consistently applied
amongst jurisdictions, 190 and the third party faces a gamble, at best, in
addressing the laundry list of factors that are subject to change. 191
Although it is apparent that courts are striving for equitable outcomes
in their consideration of facts and circumstances, the third party is
forced to absorb the risks, burdens and significant costs associated with
192
bringing the cause of action.
closeness of the connection between the attorney's conduct and the injury, (5) the
policy of preventing future hann, and (6) the burden on the profession of recognizing
liability under the circumstances." Id.
188. Restatement (Third) The Law of Governing Lawyers § 51(3); see also e.g.
Kremser v. Quarles, 36 P.3d 761 (Az. 2001); Moore v. Anderson, 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d
888 (App. 1st Dist. 2003); Estate of Leonard v. Swift, 656 N.W. 2d 132 (Iowa 2003);
Pivnick v. Beck, 165 NJ 670 (2000).
189. Auric v. ContI. Cas. Co., 331 N.W. 2d 325, 328 (Wis. 1983) (stating that there is
a constitutional right to execute a will and have it carried out according to the testator's
intentions, and by allowing an intended beneficiary to bring a cause of action against
the attorney, the attorney will be held accountable for his actions).
190. Supra n. 187 (discussing two cases where the California factors are not applied
identically).
191. See Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 686 (Cal. 1961) (including an additional
factor to be considered).
192. Attorney's fees and costs of litigation are significant and will be necessarily
absorbed by the third party bringing the cause of action.
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It should not be necessary for a third party to face these hurdles
when a patent ambiguity is at issue. The third party should not be
required to bring a cause of action which could be financially draining
and physically exhausting.
These burdens in and of themselves
sufficiently discoura~e such causes of action and amount to a waste of
judicial resources. 19
Instead, because of the existence of a patent
ambiguity, the attorney should be held accountable for his or her
obvious error and the foreseeable harm. 194
b. Foreseeable Reliance Theory
In some states, the basis for determining an attorney's liability to
a third party under the balancing of factors test is deemed too broad
and risks great interference with the attorney-client relationship.195 In
response, several jurisdictions have established an alternate theory
known as the foreseeable reliance theory.196 This theory relaxes the
harsh consequences of strict privity, allowing third party liability on a
more limited scale. The foreseeable reliance theory states that an
attorney owes a duty to a third party if it is foreseeable that the third
party will rely on the specific services rendered by that attorney.197 In

193. Since the attorney and/or his or her insurance carrier (herein defendants) will be
required to make the third party whole, the defendants will likely expend exorbitant
amounts to preclude recovery. This is especially true because damages will oftentimes
depend on the size of the estate.
194. This article is not advocating for damages greater than what the third party
would have received had the defect not occurred. See Dobbs, supra n. 21 (defining
compensatory damages).
195. See e.g. Tom W. Bell, Student Author, Limits on the Privity and Assignment of
Legal Malpractice Claims, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1533, 1538 (1992). "[A] California
appellate court pared down the balancing ... of [factor test of] attorney liability to
focus attention on situations in which 'the foreseeability of harm to the third party as a
consequence of professional negligence, is not out-weighed by other policy
considerations.'" Id.
196. See e.g. Licata v. Spector, 225 A.2d 28, 9-30 (1966) (holding that "liability for a
negligent performance of a contract ... should be imposed where the injury to the
plaintiff is foreseeable and where the contract is an incident to an enterprise of the ...
[attorney] and there are adequate [policy] reasons for imposing a duty of care"); see
Williams v. Ely, 668 N.E.2d 799, 805 (1996) (finding that "an attorney may [be held to]
owe a duty to [third parties] who the attorney knows will rely on the services
rendered"); Harper v. Harsh, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 121, *4 (Feb. 7, 1992) (holding
an attorney "liable to a ... third party who is known by him to be relying upon his
proper preparation of a document affecting vested rights of the third party").
197. Williams, 668 N.E.2d at 805.
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these jurisdictions an attorney has a duty not only to his client for
whom the testamentary documents are being prepared, but also to the
foreseeable third parties who will rely on those services. 198 The
foreseeable reliance theory requires the third party to prove reliance,
which is oftentimes a difficult task. In order for this exception to
apply, the third party would need to be involved in the client's estateplanning process. This would impose an obligation on the client to
make the third party aware of the document's contents prior to his or
her death and put the attorney on notice of the third party's knowledge.
This presents a problem when the client desires to keep his or her will
contents private until his or her death. 199 Under this theory, one court
held that an attorney advising a client owes no duty to third persons
affected by that advice "in the absence of a showing that the legal
advice was foreseeably transmitted to or relied upon by
plaintiffs .... ,,200 The use of the theory by a third party is further
complicated by the courts' interpretation of whether the attorney's
actual knowledge of the third party's reliance is required. One court
found that actual knowledge was not required so long as the average
lawyer could foresee such reliance. 201 Similar to the proposal made by
this article, the impact on the attorney-client relationship and the
attorney's ability to provide zealous representation are necessarily
compromised for the greater good of providinfi the needed protection to
third parties harmed by the patent ambiguity.2 2
When the patent ambiguity is an unidentified beneficiary, this
theory offers no recourse for the third party. Moreover, for all patent
defects under this theory, third parties will have a difficult time proving
reliance unless he or she was actively engaged in the client's estate198. Harper, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 121 at *4.
199. Dobris, supra n. 2 (differentiating a will, which becomes public record when
offered for probate, and a revocable trust, which does not become public unless it
becomes part oflitigation).
200. Goodman v. Kennedy, 556 P.2d 737, 743 (1976). The Goodman court also
explained that, "To make an attorney liable for negligent confidential advice not only
to the client who enters into a transaction in reliance [on that advice] but also to the
other parties to the transaction with whom the client deals at arm's length would inject
undesirable self-protective reservations into the attorney's [counseling] role," and
would result both in an "undue burden upon the profession and a diminution in the
quality of the legal services received by the client." Id. at 739.
201. Harper, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 121 at *7.
202. See supra n. 148 and accompanying text (5) (discussing the conflict of interest
to justifY application of the strict privity rule).
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planning process. Requiring the third party's participation in the
client's estate-planning process imposes significant obligations on the
client, which may be undesirable and unknown. 203
Other approaches to resolving patent ambiguity when a third
party's interests are at stake have proved inadequate. They place
financial burden and risk of litigation on the third party, and thereby,
make a successful malpractice action unlikely. The third party who
suffers damages as a result of a testamentary document prepared with a
patent ambiguity warrants real protection to recover for his or her
harm. Protection can only be achieved by mandating compensation
from the attorney whose carelessness caused the harm. Without such
protections, this degree of negligence will not be curtailed or deterred,
and will continue.
When a testamentary document is prepared with a patent defect,
the preparer should be accountable to the third party harmed by the
ambiguity. When the attorney's standard of care falls significantly
beneath the client's reasonable expectation of competent
representation, such as when a patent ambiguity exists in a will or trust,
then the attorney's duty should automatically extend beyond the client
to those harmed by the patent defect. Similar to the bad conduct
exception, a third party who can show harm with extrinsic evidence
should be given an avenue for recovery.204 Negligence to this degree
is easily avoided with appropriate standards and procedures during the
estate-planning process and should not be tolerated.
V. DETER FUTURE HARM WITH THE AID OF EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE

This article proposes the mere existence of a patent ambiguity in a
testamentary document gives rise to an inference of negligence and is
sufficient to allow an in~ured third party to proceed against the attorney
in a malpractice action. 05 Having alleged harm supported by reliable
extrinsic evidence, damages are determined based on what the third
party would have received had the patent defect not occurred. 206 This
proposal is intended to make it easier and more cost effective for third
203. The client may not be advised by the attorney of the third party's required
participation in his or her estate-planning process.
204. See supra pt. IV.B.2.a.
205. McLain, supra n. 127, at § 301:4 (explaining that the inference of negligence
resulting from a patent ambiguity may also be tenned "prima facie evidence").
206. See Dobbs, supra n. 21 (defining compensatory damages).
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parties harmed by the patent defect to sue the attorney in
malpractice. 207 To deter the gross carelessness, which allowed the
testamentary document to be prepared with a patent ambiguity, the law
must allow the injured third party to proceed against the responsible
attorney without the senseless need to prove he or she is worthy of
doing so.2° 8 Like the bad conduct exception this proposal will deter
future harm from this inexcusable carelessness. 209
Alternatives to this article's proposal do exist. For example,
some scholars may argue that the doctrine of reformation is the proper
method for remedying patent defects in a will or trust. 210 Reformation
is an equitable remedy used to modify a written agreement to reflect
the actual intent of the parties; however, after the testator's death, it is
not a viable solution, because actual intent cannot be determined with
certainty.
Another solution might be to liberally admit extrinsic evidence,
similar to the way in which it is used for latent ambiguities. 211
Currently five jurisdictions openly allow extrinsic evidence to explain
Other jurisdictions have eliminated the
patent ambiguities. 212
patent/latent distinction by mis-classifting the patent ambiguity as
latent and admitting extrinsic evidence. 13 Some courts adhere to the
no extrinsic evidence rule in the case of a patent ambiguity despite the

207. Damages would include recovery for reasonable attorney's fees.
208. See supra pt. IV.B.2 & 3. (discussing the approaches requiring a third party
claimant to prove that he or she was entitled to proceed with the malpractice action).
209. See supra pt. IV B.2.a.
210. E.g. deFuria, supra n. 36, at 1; John H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner,
Reformation of Wills on the Ground of Mistake: Change of Direction in American
Law?, 30 U. Pa. L. Rev. 521 (1982).
211. See supra pt. II.B.2.(discussing extrinsic evidence rule for latent ambiguities).
212. See e.g. In re Estate of Cole, 621 N.W.2d 816, 819 (Minn. App. 2001) (noting
that Wisconsin, Arizona, New York and Maine allow extrinsic evidence to explain
patent ambiguities); In re Hurley, 248 N.W. 194, 195 (S.D. 1933) (allowing extrinsic
evidence in the construction of patent ambiguities); Carlisle v. Estate of Carlisle, 252
So. 2d 894, 895 (Miss. 1971) (finding that the word meaning of the "home" a patent
ambiguity, and therefore, allowing extrinsic evidence).
213. Brandt, supra n. 67, at 24. "Extrinsic evidence will not come in to explain a
patent ambiguity-one that appears on the face of the document, but will be admissible
to cure a latent ambiguity---one that does not appear on the face of the will, but instead
appears when the will is applied to the testator's property or beneficiaries. . .. The
latent/patent distinction for the admissibility of extrinsic evidence is problematic, at
best." Id.
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consequences and the reliability of extrinsic evidence. 214 For example,
in one case in the District of Columbia, despite the fact that all
available extrinsic evidence pointed to the plaintiff, the property
escheated. 215 The truth is that the distinction between patent and latent
ambiguities for the admissibility of extrinsic evidence is shrinking. 216
Liberal~ admitting extrinsic evidence reflects the client's alleged
wishes, 17 prevents unjust enrichment218 to those not intended by the
testator, and allows the third party to recover from the estate. A rule
favoring the admission of extrinsic evidence more likely insulates the
attorney from paying for errors caused by his or her negligence. If the
third party recovers from the estate, he or she can not recover again
from the attorney for malpractice. A liberal rule of construction as to
patent defects will not force attorneys to improve practices to avoid
future harm, but instead will rescue them from liability.219 However,
there is a greater good in preventing future harm, which is ignored
when extrinsic evidence is admitted. A rule that freely considers
extrinsic evidence would not deter the patent ambiguity problem.
Furthermore, there is no assurance that using extrinsic evidence to
resolve the patent ambiguity will accurately ascertain the true
intentions of the testator. Due to the testator's absence, extrinsic
evidence provides no certainty?20 Although this rule of construction
attempts to do what the testator intended from the start, it would place
the careless attorney at a lower risk of being sued. The law is filled
with rules of construction, which assist the sloppy estate planners. For

214. See Knupp v. D.C.. 578 A.2d 702,705-706 (D.C. 1990). "No matter how clearly
a testator's wish to make a particular disposition may appear from sources outside the
will, a court [cannot] give it effect unless the words written into the will effect that
disposition or are reasonably susceptible to ... interpretation." /d. In Knupp, the
extrinsic evidence included an affidavit by the attorney "admitting that he ... failed to
designate a residual beneficiary in the will even though the testator had instructed him
to name Knupp" and the fact that the testator's two prior wills named Knupp. [d. at
704.
215. [d. at 703.
216. Brandt, supra n. 67, at 24.
217. Auric v. Conti. Cas. Co., 331 N.W.2d 325,328 (Wis. 1983).
218. John H. Langbein, Curing Execution Errors and Mistaken Terms in Wills: The
Restatement of Wills Delivers New Tools (and New Duties) to Probate Lawyers, Prob.
& Prop. 28, 31 (Jan./Feb. 2004).
219. Supra n. 183 and accompanying text (discussing the balancing of factor element
of preventing future harm).
220. See Jarboe, supra n. 5, at 1373 n. 51.
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example, the presumption a~ainst intestacy,221 the four-corner rule,222
and the plain meaning rule 2 3 protect the sloppy estate-planner. This
article suggests that extrinsic evidence should be used to ascertain the
injury caused by the patent ambiguity. Thus, all extrinsic evidence
should be considered to determine which third party was harmed and to
what extent. 224 This proposal advocates for the use of extrinsic
evidence, not to save the negligent attorney from liability, but to
determine who should recover from the attorney and how much.
This proposal is not overly burdensome for general practitioners
or sole proprietors. It will require them to implement essential steps
and procedures to avoid patent defects in testamentary documents.
Holding attorneys accountable for the grossly negligent preparation of
testamentary documents will require estate planners to shape up or ship
out. This policy will prevent future harm and will provide an incentive
for attorneys to pay greater attention to detail and encourage
specialization. 225
This author acknowledges that the lack of certainty in
ascertaining harm remains. An unavoidable risk exists that the patent
ambiguity may be resolved in favor of the beneficiary who is best
positioned to litigate. 226 The extrinsic evidence itself can assist the
court in its determination as to reliability. However, the overriding
policy that makes it necessary to protect against the carelessness that

221. Dobris, supra n. 2, at 262.
222. Young v. Allstate Ins. Co., 812 N.E.2d 741, 747 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 2004)
(finding that "[u]nder the 'four comers rule,' a written agreement must be presumed to
speak the intention of the parties who signed it and the intentions regarding its
execution must be determined from the language used, unchanged by extrinsic
evidence").
223. Plain meaning rule is defined as "if a writing, or a provision in a writing,
appears to be unambiguous on its face, its meaning must be determined from the
writing itself without resort to any extrinsic evidence." Black's Law Dictionary at
1188.
224. Supra n. 21 (discussing that damages naturally flow and will depend on the size
of the estate or the patent defect. For example, if the patent uncertainty failed to
designate a residual beneficiary, then the amount that passes intestate as a result of the
defect should be the amount of damages received by the individual who would have
taken the rest and residue but for the patent defect.).
225. These are skills that academics impress upon students with the hopes that they
will follow students as they enter into the practice oflaw.
226. See generally Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1961) (discussing attorney's
need to defend and the costs they might be willing to spend to do so).
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caused the patent ambiguity nonetheless warrants these changes in the
law to allow the admissibility of extrinsic evidence to show injury.
VI. CONCLUSION

In the estate-planning area, the standard of competent
representation amounts to a detailed set of requirements necessary to
ensure the document complies with statutory formalities and is free
from patent ambiguities. Yet, an attorney's failure to render this level
of service is of no consequence to the negligent attorney. The current
law fails to impose a duty on the attorney to draft documents free from
patent ambiguities that would extend to and protect third parties at the
testator's death. The existence of a patent ambiguity in a testamentary
document should be prima facie negligence. 227 This article proposes
that when legal services are rendered in the preparation of testamentary
documents, the duty of care, which amounts to competent
representation, requires that the resulting document be free from patent
ambiguities, and further, that such duty be extended to third parties.
Third parties harmed by the patent ambiguity must be permitted to
introduce extrinsic evidence, not to insulate the attorney from a
malpractice claim, but to fuel his or her cause of action.
Current law provides insufficient protection for such an obvious
error. In light of the consequences to the third party, policy warrants
changes that equate to a real remedy and will deter future harm.
Neither the Model Rules of Professional Conduct nor existing
malpractice rules serve as a sufficient deterrent. These proposed
changes will encourage competent representation and provide third
parties with a viable avenue to pursue a remedy when testamentary
documents are patently defective.

227. This is not the first time a permitted inference of negligence has been drawn.
See e.g. Brammer v. Taylor, 338 S.E.2d 207, 213 (W. Va. 1985) (finding that negligent
supervision of the testator's codicil would be prima facie negligence).

